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PROCEDURE AS PALIMPSEST  
CATHERINE T. STRUVE† 
Ask an artist about the importance of “Twombly,” and he or she 
will likely think you are referring to Cy Twombly.  Ask a lawyer about 
the importance of “Twombly,” and she will undoubtedly understand 
you to be asking about Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.1  That the Su-
preme Court’s landmark pleading decision from the spring of 2007 
bears the same name as the abstract painter is purely coincidental; but 
on consideration, the Twombly decision bears some similarity to 
Twombly’s work.  Take any of a number of Twombly paintings from 
the late 1950s through the 1970s, and you will find indistinct forms 
that can be interpreted in numerous ways and erasures that are as sig-
nificant as the marks scribbled atop them.2  Twombly’s paintings have 
been characterized as palimpsests—images in which the most recent 
marks do not fully obscure the earlier patterns.3  Likewise, one of 
 
 † Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I thank the members of the 
Executive Committee of the Civil Procedure Section of the Association of American 
Law Schools for selecting the three articles in this collection, and Thom Main for serv-
ing as the moderator of the meeting at which these papers were presented.  I am in-
debted to Stephen Burbank and Kevin Clermont for very helpful comments on prior 
drafts of this Foreword.  
1 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
2 See generally KIRK VARNEDOE, CY TWOMBLY:  A RETROSPECTIVE (1994) (accompa-
nying and cataloging an exhibition of Twombly’s work at the Museum of Modern Art 
in New York). 
3 See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, Cy Twombly, ou ‘Non multa sed multum,’ in V ROLAND 
BARTHES:  OEUVRES COMPLÈTES 703, 710 (Éric Marty ed., new rev. ed. 2002) (“[L]a 
main a tracé quelque chose comme une fleur et puis s’est mise à traîner sur cette trace; 
la fleur a été écrite, puis désécrite; mais les deux mouvements restent vaguement  
surimprimés; c’est un palimpseste pervers . . . .”).  The third edition of Webster’s defines 
a palimpsest as, inter alia, “a parchment, tablet, or other portion of writing material  
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Twombly’s key features is an erasure:  Twombly “retire[s]”4 the Court’s 
statement a half-century earlier in Conley v. Gibson “that a complaint 
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 
his claim which would entitle him to relief.”5  The indeterminate new 
marks made by Twombly caused urgent debate:  how should courts in-
terpret—and how broadly should they apply—the Twombly Court’s 
conclusion that the plaintiffs’ antitrust complaint must be dismissed 
because their claim of conspiracy was not “plausible”?6  Just under two 
years later, the Court answered the question of scope:  it made clear in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal that Twombly’s new approach to pleading applies to all 
cases in federal court—not merely to complex antitrust class actions.7 
To interpret Twombly and Iqbal, we must view those decisions in 
the light of the procedural law that forms their background.  The 
three articles in this collection do so in distinct but complementary 
ways.  And in so doing, they examine not only pleading standards but 
other interlocking aspects of contemporary civil procedure.  Professor 
Edward Hartnett’s close analysis of Twombly and Iqbal focuses our at-
tention on underlying historical assumptions concerning the plausibil-
ity of inferences.  Through this analysis, he suggests to advocates the 
importance of educating judges concerning such questions of plausi-
bility in the context of the particular case.  Professor Hartnett also ex-
amines the connection between motions to dismiss and discovery, and 
he finds that, even post-Iqbal, the district judge enjoys discretion to 
permit targeted discovery—pending the disposition of a motion to 
dismiss—in ways that may promote the survival of claims that might 
otherwise be dismissed.  In considering Professor Elizabeth Schneid-
er’s article, we step several paces further back, so that our field of vi-
sion takes in not only pleading but also summary judgment and the evi-
dentiary principles that govern expert testimony.  Professor Schneider 
argues forcefully that these doctrines combine to tilt the balance against 
plaintiffs in civil rights and employment actions, and she considers the 
 
that has been used twice or three times after the earlier writing has been erased.”  
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1625 (3d ed. 1981). 
4 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. 
5 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 
6 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (“Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their 
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”). 
7 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly ex-
pounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and dis-
crimination suits alike.” (citation omitted)). 
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implications of this insight for the role of federal judges in these impor-
tant categories of litigation.  Professor Scott Dodson broadens our field 
of inquiry further still, by suggesting that we evaluate the effects of 
Twombly and Iqbal in the light of pleading standards not only in the 
United States but also abroad.  In combination, these articles have 
much to tell us, not just about Twombly and Iqbal, but about develop-
ments in U.S. federal civil procedure and the consequences of those 
developments for the enforcement of substantive rights. 
In Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, Professor Hartnett begins by 
examining the reasoning behind the Twombly Court’s holding that a 
complaint alleging a “contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce” in violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act8 cannot “survive a motion to dismiss when it alleges that major tel-
ecommunications providers engaged in certain parallel conduct unfa-
vorable to competition, absent some factual context suggesting 
agreement, as distinct from identical, independent action.”9  He 
summarizes the scholarly criticism of Twombly and notes in particular 
the concern that “the Court imposed a heightened specificity stan-
dard of pleading and that plaintiffs will lack the evidence to plead 
these specifics prior to discovery.”10  Professor Hartnett observes that 
though Twombly could have been read as a decision concerning the 
substantive requirements for an antitrust conspiracy claim—rather 
than as a decision that bears on pleading standards generally—there 
was ample support in the Twombly opinion for the contrary reading.11  
And, as Professor Hartnett explains, lower federal courts promptly 
applied Twombly in a range of substantive areas outside antitrust.12  
Professor Hartnett also considers the possibility that Twombly could 
have been viewed as focusing on “complex cases involving the likelih-
ood of extremely expensive discovery.”13  Again, he notes that passages 
of broad language in Twombly cut against such a limiting interpreta-
tion.  Moreover, he suggests, reading Twombly to alter the pleading 
standard in complex cases with expensive discovery “would put the 
 
8 Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
9 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548-49. 
10 Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 
474 (2010). 
11 Id. at 475-79.  
12 Id. at 479-80.  
13 Id. at 478. 
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decision in serious tension with the transsubstantive approach of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”14 
Here Professor Hartnett identifies one of the major current chal-
lenges for federal civil procedure.  Should the Civil Rules continue to 
take a rigorously transsubstantive approach that applies the same pro-
visions to the most complex and the simplest of cases?15  If so, do we 
run the risk that the Rules will be adapted to the needs of the com-
plex cases in a way that distorts their application to smaller, simpler 
disputes?  In one respect, the Civil Rules explicitly depart from a 
transsubstantive approach by exempting specified types of cases from 
Rule 26(a)’s initial-disclosure requirement,16 Rule 26(d)’s discovery 
moratorium,17 and Rule 26(f )’s conference procedure.18  More recent-
ly—and without crafting a special rule for particular types of cases—
the rulemakers altered Rule 26 to take special account of actions in 
which electronic discovery is particularly burdensome.19  And, of course, 
the Civil Rules’ pleading standards have never been entirely transsubs-
 
14 Id. at 480. 
15 See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 535, 542 (“[T]he normative question whether we are well served today by a rule-
making enterprise that continues to frame rules and amendments for all cases filed in 
federal district court, no matter what the source or content of the substantive law, has 
been a subject of vigorous discussion and debate in the literature.”). 
16 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (exempting from the initial-disclosure require-
ment actions for review on an administrative record, in rem forfeiture actions arising 
from a federal statute, habeas petitions and other challenges to a criminal conviction, 
pro se actions by federal or state prisoners, actions concerning administrative sum-
monses or subpoenas, federal government actions to recover benefit payments, federal 
government actions to collect on student loans, proceedings ancillary to proceedings 
in other courts, and arbitration-award enforcement proceedings). 
17 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) (“A party may not seek discovery from any source 
before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f ), except in a proceeding 
exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these 
rules, by stipulation, or by court order.”). 
18 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f )(1) (“Except in a proceeding exempted from initial dis-
closure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B) or when the court orders otherwise, the parties must 
confer as soon as practicable—and in any event at least 21 days before a scheduling 
conference is to be held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b).”). 
19 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“A party need not provide discovery of electron-
ically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably access-
ible because of undue burden or cost.  On motion to compel discovery or for a protec-
tive order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is 
not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.  If that showing is made, 
the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party 
shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).  The court may 
specify conditions for the discovery.”). 
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tantive; Civil Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement for pleading fraud or 
mistake dates back to 1938.20  But these are exceptions; in the main, the 
Civil Rules couple a transsubstantive approach with numerous grants of 
discretion that, in practice, allow the district court to tailor its practice to 
the needs of the particular case.  Whether that largely transsubstantive 
approach will continue to hold is a key question. 
In any event, as Professor Hartnett notes, the reach of Twombly has 
now been settled.21  Iqbal involved very different facts and claims than 
Twombly.  Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim citizen of Pakistan, brought constitu-
tional claims against a number of federal officials stemming from his 
detention on federal charges after September 11, 2001.22  At issue in 
the appeal that reached the Supreme Court were Iqbal’s claims 
against Robert Mueller (the Director of the FBI) and John Ashcroft 
(the former United States Attorney General).  Iqbal alleged that Muel-
ler and Ashcroft were responsible for his subjection to abusive condi-
tions of confinement based on his race, religion, or national origin.23  
A closely divided Supreme Court held that Iqbal’s allegations failed to 
state a claim against those two defendants.24  The Court first addressed 
the substantive law governing Iqbal’s claims, and concluded that those 
claims required discriminatory purpose on the part of Mueller and 
Ashcroft.25  Though Iqbal did allege such a purpose, the Court found 
those allegations conclusory and disregarded them; and the Court 
held that the complaint’s remaining allegations failed to render Iq-
bal’s claims against Mueller and Ashcroft plausible because, in the 
 
20 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.  Malice, intent, know-
ledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”).  Stephen 
Burbank has noted that Rule 9(b) is not substance specific in the way that a rule target-
ing only particular types of claims would be substance specific.  See Stephen B. Bur-
bank, Procedure, Politics and Power:  The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 
1732 n.248 (2004) (“A Federal Rule requiring heightened pleading in ‘all averments of 
fraud or mistake’ is one thing.  A proposed Federal Rule attempting to impose heigh-
tened pleading requirements as to a particular substantive claim would be quite 
another . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
21 Hartnett, supra note 10, at 481. 
22 See First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand ¶¶ 1, 9, at 2-4, Elmaghraby v. 
Ashcroft, No. 04-1809, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Iqbal 
Complaint]. 
23 Id. ¶¶ 1-3, 10, 11, at 2-5. 
24 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009). 
25 See id. at 1948 (2009) (“Where the claim is invidious discrimination in contra-
vention of the First and Fifth Amendment . . . the plaintiff must plead and prove that 
the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.”). 
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Court’s view, it was more likely that Mueller and Ashcroft’s actions were 
motivated by legitimate law-enforcement purposes than by a discrimina-
tory purpose.26  In the process, the Court roundly rejected any attempt 
to cabin Twombly as an antitrust decision:  Twombly, the Iqbal Court 
stated, “expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions.’”27 
What, then, is the content of that universally applicable pleading 
standard?  In Part II of his article, Professor Hartnett offers an impor-
tant and helpful interpretation of Twombly’s plausibility requirement.  
Professor Hartnett rejects the view that Twombly permits dismissal of a 
complaint because the district judge finds the facts alleged or the legal 
theory advanced in the complaint to be implausible.28  Rather, he sug-
gests, the plausibility analysis that Twombly invites concerns the plausi-
bility of the inferences to be drawn from the facts.29  Thus, he argues, 
“Twombly’s insistence that the inference of conspiracy be ‘plausible’ is 
equivalent to the traditional insistence that an inference be ‘reasona-
ble.’”30  And the plausibility of the inference, Professor Hartnett con-
tends, can depend on the context of the claim.31  Turning to Form 11 
(formerly Form 9), which famously pleads negligence liability merely 
by stating that “[o]n date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a 
motor vehicle against the plaintiff,”32 Professor Hartnett suggests that 
the Form’s stark simplicity can be viewed as a reflection of the fami-
liarity of car-accident negligence claims—and he supports this insight 
by citing Charles Clark for the proposition that even in the nineteenth 
century equally simple allegations would have sufficed to ground a 
negligence claim.33 
 
26 See id. at 1951 (rejecting as “bare assertions” Iqbal’s allegations that “petitioners 
‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]’ to harsh 
conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, 
race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest’” (alterations in 
original)); id. (“On the facts respondent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely 
lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally 
present in the United States and who had potential connections to those who commit-
ted terrorist acts.”). 
27 Id. at 1953. 
28 Hartnett, supra note 10, at 481-83. 
29 Id. at 483-84. 
30 Id. at 484-85. 
31 See id. at 492-93 (“[W]hat is ‘conclusory’ depends on the right of action on 
which the claimant seeks relief and the conclusions that are necessary to relief under 
that right of action.”). 
32 FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11.  
33 Hartnett, supra note 10, at 493-94. 
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By contrast, in other contexts, the inferences that the plaintiff 
wishes to draw from the facts in the complaint may not strike the 
judge as plausible.  The judge’s willingness to regard a particular infe-
rence as plausible, Professor Hartnett observes, may depend in part 
on the judge’s own range of experience.34  And this has implications 
for the advocate:  “Twombly can be understood as inviting lawyers to 
present information and argument designed to convince a judge that 
what the judge thinks is ‘natural’ is not.”35  Professor Hartnett’s insight 
is of central importance to lawyers who must now operate under a 
post-Twombly regime.  Given Twombly’s invitation to judges to police 
the plausibility of inferences at the stage of the motion to dismiss,36 
advocates must do their best to explain their case in a way that, where 
necessary, broadens the judge’s perspective. 
But this insight also helps to explain why many commentators are 
uncomfortable with both Twombly and Iqbal.  Instead of broadening 
the judge’s perspective, there is an alternative way to ensure that a 
breadth of perspective is brought to bear on the inferences in the 
case:  namely, to send the case to the jury.  Here it is helpful to recall 
Justice Hunt’s discussion of the jury’s role in Sioux City & Pacific Rail-
road Co. v. Stout.37  Justice Hunt, writing for the Court, conceded that 
in “extreme” cases “the necessary inference from the proof is so cer-
tain that it may be ruled as a question of law.”38  For example, 
if a coachdriver intentionally drives within a few inches of a precipice, 
and an accident happens, negligence may be ruled as a question of law.  
On the other hand, if he had placed a suitable distance between his 
coach and the precipice, but by the breaking of a rein or an axle, which 
could not have been anticipated, an injury occurred, it might be ruled as 
a question of law that there was no negligence and no liability.
39
   
But between such extreme cases lies a spectrum of other factual sce-
narios—“almost infinite in variety and extent”40—in which the infe-
rences to be drawn are properly for the jury. 
 
34 Id. at 498-503. 
35 Id. at 500. 
36 See Burbank, supra note 15, at 540 (noting “the threat that legal indeterminacy 
about the freedom of judges to police inferences presents to policies underlying both 
the substantive law and the Seventh Amendment”). 
37 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1874). 
38 Id. at 663. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of educa-
tion and men of little education, men of learning and men whose learn-
ing consists only in what they have themselves seen and heard, the mer-
chant, the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, 
apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven, 
and draw a unanimous conclusion.  This average judgment thus given it 
is the great effort of the law to obtain.  It is assumed that twelve men 
know more of the common affairs of life than does one man, that they 
can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring 
than can a single judge.
41
  
To the extent that Twombly encourages judges to dismiss cases at the 
pleading stage on the ground that the plaintiff’s desired inferences 
are implausible, the judgments that might otherwise be made by a jury 
will instead be made by the judge.  The concerns raised by such dis-
missals at the pleading stage are even starker than the similar con-
cerns raised by the possible overuse of summary judgment, because 
summary judgment ordinarily will not be granted without an oppor-
tunity for discovery.42 
Here, though, Professor Hartnett provides another central insight:  
he points out that the pendency of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim does not ordinarily operate to delay discov-
ery.43  A plaintiff can plead the facts for which he or she already has 
evidentiary support, and can also plead factual allegations that “will 
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for fur-
ther investigation or discovery.”44  By specifically identifying the latter 
type of allegation (as required by Rule 11(b)(3)), the plaintiff “there-
by focus[es] on the key issue of discovery to substantiate such allega-
tions.”45  Once attention is focused on the key areas where discovery is 
needed in order to support those allegations, “[t]he court could allow 
limited discovery, targeted at the identified allegation, and establish a 
briefing schedule for any motion to dismiss that follows the comple-
tion of that limited discovery.”46  The rigors of such an approach 
 
41 Id. at 664. 
42 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) (“If a party opposing the motion shows by affidavit that, 
for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court 
may:  (1) deny the motion; (2) order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, 
depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken; or (3) issue any other 
just order.”). 
43 Hartnett, supra note 10, at 507. 
44 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
45 Hartnett, supra note 10, at 505. 
46 Id. at 509-10. 
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might challenge plaintiffs who (prior to discovery) lack a deep know-
ledge of information that is uniquely within the defendant’s posses-
sion; but it could nonetheless give the skilled plaintiff’s lawyer an op-
portunity to pursue the information needed to flesh out key points in 
the complaint.  This might be particularly true if the plaintiff’s exist-
ing information comes from informants who are reluctant to be iden-
tified in the complaint47 but whose information could help the plain-
tiff’s lawyer to shape the course of targeted discovery. 
Professor Hartnett thus identifies two ways in which, under Twom-
bly and Iqbal, district judges retain discretion to permit claims to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, even where some 
judges might view the plaintiff’s desired inferences with a skeptical 
eye.  First, the judge might take the plausibility standard as an invita-
tion to consider a range of perspectives—some perhaps outside the 
judge’s own experience—when evaluating the inferences that can be 
drawn from the facts alleged in the complaint.48  Second, even if the 
judge might not consider such inferences to be plausible on the facts 
as alleged in the original complaint, the judge can provide an oppor-
tunity for discovery that may enable the plaintiff, by amendment, to 
fill in gaps in the original complaint.49  But Professor Hartnett ac-
knowledges frankly that these avenues for taming Twombly depend on 
the discretion of the district judge.50  The district judges may cabin 
Twombly, but who will cabin the district judges? 
In The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination 
Cases, Professor Schneider expands our consideration of trial-judge 
discretion by examining three related contexts:  pleading, summary 
judgment, and expert testimony.51  She argues that in each of these 
areas, developments over the past thirty years have augmented the dis-
trict judge’s authority to reject claims of civil rights violations and em-
ployment discrimination.  Part I of her article commences by review-
ing empirical studies that indicate the challenges faced by federal-
court plaintiffs in such cases.52  Professor Schneider notes preliminary 
 
47 See generally Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 711-12 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (assessing a complaint’s use of information from confidential sources). 
48 Hartnett, supra note 10, at 499-503.  
49 Id. at 509-12. 
50 Id. at 513-15.  
51 Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice:  The 
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
517 (2010). 
52 Id. at 524-26. 
STRUVE_REVISED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2010  6:36 PM 
430 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 421 
 
findings showing that, even pre-Iqbal, courts were applying Twombly in 
employment and civil rights cases and suggesting that Twombly’s appli-
cation in such cases was adversely affecting such claims.53  Professor 
Schneider then highlights a number of decisions applying Iqbal in the 
context of civil rights cases; her review of those decisions demonstrates 
the broad discretion that Iqbal vests in district judges.54  Some judges, 
she suggests, are taking Iqbal as a license to bring their own precon-
ceptions concerning civil rights and employment discrimination 
claims to bear on motions to dismiss such claims.55 
Turning to summary judgment, Professor Schneider describes a 
similar dynamic.  Here the question of judicial perspective—which 
Professor Hartnett, too, has addressed in connection with pleading 
decisions—recurs in connection with summary judgment. 
[I]n civil rights or employment discrimination cases . . . where subtle issues 
of credibility, inferences, and close legal questions may be involved, where 
issues concerning the “genuineness” or “materiality” of facts are frequently 
intertwined with law, a single district judge may be a less preferable deci-
sion maker than a jury.  Juries are likely to be far more diverse and to bring 
a broader range of perspectives to bear on the problem.
56
  
Moreover, Professor Schneider suggests, some judges take a mechanis-
tic approach to evaluating summary judgment motions, analyzing 
pieces of evidence in isolation from each other and failing to consider 
the whole of the evidence in context.57  Such an approach differs from 
that which jurors are likely to employ when deciding a case.  Not only 
will the jurors bring to the case a variety of life experiences (and thus 
a range of perspectives) but it seems likely that jurors will tend to eva-
luate the case by fitting each piece of evidence into a narrative that 
makes sense of the case as a whole.58 
 
53 Id. at 532. 
54 Id. at 533-35. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 542-43. 
57 Id. at 544. 
58 See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Mak-
ing, in INSIDE THE JUROR:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192, 194 
(Reid Hastie ed., 1993) (“The story model is based on the hypothesis that jurors impose 
a narrative story organization on trial information.  According to the theory, the story 
will be constructed from three types of knowledge . . . :  (A) case-specific information 
acquired during the trial . . . ; (B) knowledge about events similar in content to those 
that are the topic of dispute . . . ; and (C) generic expectations about what makes a 
complete story (e.g., knowledge that human actions are usually motivated by goals).”). 
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Professor Schneider aptly illustrates her argument by reference to 
Scott v. Harris.59  In Harris, the Supreme Court reversed the lower 
courts’ denial of summary judgment for the defendant in a case aris-
ing from a high-speed chase.60  The Court’s ruling depended on the 
view that “no reasonable jury” could fail to conclude from the evi-
dence that “[t]he car chase that respondent initiated in this case 
posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to 
others” and that the defendant’s “attempt to terminate the chase by 
forcing respondent off the road was reasonable.”61  Justice Stevens’s 
lone dissent asserted that “jurors in Georgia should be allowed to eva-
luate the reasonableness of the decision to ram respondent’s speeding 
vehicle in a manner that created an obvious risk of death and has in 
fact made him a quadriplegic at the age of 19.”62 
As Professor Schneider points out, a recent study by Dan Kahan, 
David Hoffman, and Don Braman can illuminate our understanding 
of the debate between Justice Stevens and the Harris majority.63  Pro-
fessors Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman showed the video of the Harris 
chase to 1350 people.64  They found that 
[a] very sizable majority of our diverse, nationally representative sample 
agreed with the Scott majority that Harris’s driving exposed the public 
and the police to lethal risks, that Harris was more at fault than the po-
lice for putting the public in danger, and that deadly force ultimately was 
reasonable to terminate the chase.
65
   
But they also discerned patterns among viewers in that majority and 
among viewers who took the contrary view:  “Individuals (particularly 
white males) who hold hierarchical and individualist cultural 
worldviews, who are politically conservative, who are affluent, and who 
reside in the West were likely to form significantly more pro-
defendant risk perceptions.”66  By contrast, 
[i]ndividuals who hold egalitarian and communitarian views, whose poli-
tics are liberal, who are well educated but likely less affluent, and whose 
 
59 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
60 Id. at 386. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 397 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
63 Schneider, supra note 51, at 547-48 & n.147 . 
64 Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Be-
lieve?  Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009). 
65 Id. at 879. 
66 Id. 
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ranks include disproportionately more African Americans and wom-
en . . . were significantly more likely to form pro-plaintiff views and to re-
ject the conclusion that the police acted reasonably in using deadly force 
to terminate the chase.
67
  
Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman criticize the grant of summary judg-
ment in Harris on a number of grounds.  One is that, even if we as-
sume that in a given jury a majority of jurors might respond as a ma-
jority of the viewers did in the study, the jury’s deliberations could 
provide an opportunity for those taking the minority view to persuade 
those in the majority to reconsider their perceptions.68 
Professor Schneider’s analysis of summary judgment, then, sug-
gests a conclusion similar to that which one might draw from Profes-
sor Hartnett’s discussion of motions to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim.  In both contexts, the judge’s ability to perceive a range of 
perspectives other than her own may be vital in determining whether 
the judge permits a case to proceed further—and thus, potentially, to 
reach a jury that might embody that greater diversity of perspectives.69  
Likewise, Professor Hartnett’s suggestion that plaintiffs might use so-
cial science data to broaden the judge’s perspective at the Rule 
12(b)(6) stage70 resonates with Professor Schneider’s observations 
concerning the vital role that social scientists can play as experts in 
discrimination cases.71  Professor Schneider’s article thus underscores 
the importance of investigating the impact of the Daubert standard on 
rulings concerning social science experts in such cases.72  District 
court rulings concerning such testimony may be particularly pivotal, 
 
67 Id. 
68 See id. at 885 (“The experience of interacting with others whose understandings 
of social reality differ from theirs—and thus learning that their own understandings, 
and hence their views of the facts, are partial—might cause jurors of diverse identities 
to converge on a common view of the facts, particularly where one side’s initial view is 
less intensely held than the other’s.”).  Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman also suggest a 
process value in denying summary judgment where an identifiable minority of poten-
tial jurors would disagree with the majority’s view of the appropriate case outcome.  See 
id. (“[ J]ury deliberation can invest law with democratic legitimacy even when factual 
understandings born of diverse experiences and social influence persist.”). 
69 Obviously, most federal cases do not go to trial even if they survive the Rule 
12(b)(6) and summary judgment stages. 
70 Hartnett, supra note 10, at 503. 
71 Schneider, supra note 51, at 553-55. 
72 See id. at 555 (noting that there is “less information on what is actually happening 
with Daubert in the pretrial context than other aspects of pretrial procedure,” but suggest-
ing that “there is good reason to believe that the lethal combination of Daubert and sum-
mary judgment has affected” civil rights and employment discrimination cases). 
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Professor Schneider notes, because such rulings are reviewed only for 
abuse of discretion (in contrast to summary judgment grants, which 
are reviewed de novo).73  Professor Schneider also impresses upon us 
the need to consider procedural devices as an interlocking set, and to 
scrutinize proposed changes in those devices for signs that the 
changes might disproportionately impact particular types of litigation 
(such as employment discrimination or other civil rights cases).74  But 
in the end, Professor Schneider, like Professor Hartnett, returns to 
the importance of good judging—including the importance of a 
judge’s openness to the perspectives of others whose experiences dif-
fer from her own.75 
If Professors Schneider and Hartnett invite us to study Twombly’s 
pleading standard as part of an interconnected web of federal court 
procedures, Professor Dodson calls on us to enlarge our focus by 
comparing the United States’ approach to pleading with that em-
ployed in other countries.  In Comparative Convergences in Pleading 
Standards, Professor Dodson situates this invitation within the larger 
project of the comparative study of civil procedure, and he thus be-
gins by summarizing the benefits and challenges of that larger 
project.76  Comparing the United States’ approach to those taken in 
other common law jurisdictions and in civil law jurisdictions serves a 
number of purposes.  The comparison reveals the many ways in which 
U.S. procedure is exceptional, and thus invites U.S. scholars to recon-
sider the range of procedural possibilities.  Moreover, an examination 
 
73 See id. at 551-52 (“Daubert rulings may be the preferred method of district court 
resolution because they provide greater discretion for district court judges and less 
chance of reversal on appeal.”).  This insight also helps to address one question that 
might arise concerning Professor Schneider’s earlier point about district court grants 
of summary judgment.  In one way, there might be a structural incentive not to grant 
summary judgment:  grants of summary judgment that end the entire case produce an 
appealable judgment and thus raise the prospect of immediate appellate review, whe-
reas denials ordinarily will not be immediately appealable.  (An exception exists in cer-
tain contexts, such as some denials of motions based on qualified immunity.)  The 
prospect of immediate de novo appellate review might lessen the incentives for a dis-
trict judge to grant summary judgment dismissing a case (though, admittedly, there 
are contrary incentives, given that dismissing a case helps to clear the judge’s docket); 
but if the grant of summary judgment is based upon the exclusion of the plaintiff’s ex-
pert witness’s testimony, then the operative reasoning that underpins the dismissal will 
receive more deferential review. 
74 Id. at 556-57. 
75 Id. at 569. 
76 See Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 441, 444-47 (2010). 
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of the processes a society chooses for dispute resolution may reveal 
broader and deeper differences concerning the presuppositions on 
which the society is founded.77 
Having thus framed the pleading question within this broader 
context, Professor Dodson notes the intriguing contrast between U.S. 
pleading practices and those of other countries.  The United States’ 
system of notice pleading contrasts sharply, he observes, with the 
pleading requirements imposed in Germany, France, Japan, England, 
and other countries.78  But, he notes, the comparative project must al-
so recognize that a country’s procedure is likely to be dynamic rather 
than static, and thus the project should entail not only a review of dif-
ferent countries’ current practices but also the study of changes in 
each country’s practices.79  Accordingly, Professor Dodson insightfully 
considers the development of the United States’ pleading practices 
over time, noting the effects of the Supreme Court’s 1957 decision in 
Conley v. Gibson80 as well as the Supreme Court’s more recent (pre-
Twombly) decisions rejecting judicial efforts to impose heightened 
pleading standards.81 
Professor Dodson comments that the comparative study of plead-
ing practices is particularly apposite now, because the United States 
has shown signs of shifting closer to the pleading approach adopted 
by other countries.  Here Professor Dodson draws together both legis-
lative and case law developments.  With respect to case law, Professor 
Dodson recounts the debate over Twombly’s scope and merits, and he 
discusses the Iqbal Court’s response to that debate.82  He observes that 
Iqbal directs the application of Twombly across the board.  He also as-
serts that Iqbal and Twombly “shift [the] focus from notice to facts,” 
thus rendering federal pleading “more akin to foreign pleading re-
 
77 See, e.g., William B. Ewald, What’s So Special About American Law?, Keynote 
Speech of the Annual Quinlan Lecture at the Oklahoma City University School of Law 
(Mar. 29, 2001) (suggesting that “the deepest differences between the American and 
the European legal systems are all linked, in one way or another, to . . . two different 
ways of thinking about the state and popular democracy”), in 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
1083, 1100 (2001). 
78 See Dodson, supra note 76, at 452 (stating that “no other country’s pleading re-
quirements are so relaxed” as those of the United States). 
79 Id. at 452 n.69. 
80 355 U.S. 41 (1957); see Dodson, supra note 76, at 450-52. 
81 See Dodson, supra note 76, at 451-52 & n.66 (discussing, inter alia, Leatherman 
v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), 
and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)). 
82 Id. at 457-62. 
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gimes.”83  Here we find another synergy among the articles in this col-
lection:  Professor Hartnett’s reading of Twombly as directing a plausi-
bility analysis that varies with the context of the case yields an impor-
tant nuance for the comparative project.  Professor Hartnett’s 
observations that “[p]lausibility of inference is not the same as speci-
ficity of factual allegation” and that the plausibility test’s application 
“will depend on what facts the substantive law makes material and on 
the appropriate inferential connections between facts”84 give us reason 
to think that we now have fact pleading for some things in some fed-
eral cases—not for all things in all federal cases.  Professor Dodson 
aptly picks up this thread when he notes that the Twombly/Iqbal plau-
sibility standard “has a different focus than the pleading regimes in 
other countries.”85 
The Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard has not only a different fo-
cus but also, I suspect, a different set of justifications.  Neither Twombly 
nor Iqbal makes any attempt to justify the plausibility approach by ref-
erence to the existence of tougher pleading standards elsewhere in 
the world.  Perhaps ironically, a number of the Justices who favor the 
new pleading test deplore reliance on foreign law, and vice versa.  Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas—who voted with the majority in both Twombly 
and Iqbal—have asserted (albeit in a different context) that the notion 
“that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the 
world . . . ought to be rejected out of hand.”86  Conversely, Justice 
Ginsburg—who dissented in both cases—has argued with respect to 
constitutional adjudication that “[w]e are the losers if we do not both 
share our experience with, and learn from others.”87  The Justices have 
not taken their dispute over foreign sources into the pleading field; 
rather, they have couched the pleading debate—at least so far—in 
domestic terms.  But perhaps future cases will give them an occasion 
to heed Professor Dodson’s suggestion that “[p]leadings convergence, 
particularly if justified by comparative sources, may go a long way to-
 
83 Id. at 462-63. 
84 Hartnett, supra note 10, at 495-96. 
85 Dodson, supra note 76, at 463. 
86 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. 
& Thomas, J., dissenting). 
87 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders:  The Value of a Comparative 
Perspective In Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 1 (2003). 
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ward making a good-faith showing of  willingness to join the interna-
tional conversation on civil procedure.”88 
As Professor Dodson points out, the shift in Twombly and Iqbal to-
ward a more rigorous pleading standard parallels similar statutory de-
velopments.  In the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA), Congress imposed a heightened pleading standard for 
fraud claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.89  And in the 
Y2K Act, Congress set heightened pleading requirements for certain 
claims of harm arising from computer failures in connection with the 
start of the year 2000.90 
Professor Dodson’s juxtaposition of these three pleading devel-
opments is illuminating in several ways.  First, it directs our attention 
to the source of the pleading requirement.  When a heightened 
pleading requirement is confined to a particular subject area and is 
imposed by the body that also creates the substantive rules of law for 
that subject area—as was true in the case of the PSLRA—that might be 
thought to raise fewer concerns than would the judicial creation of a 
heightened pleading requirement that may apply to many types of 
claims and that may affect the vindication of rights created by the 
Constitution or by statute.91 
Second, viewing Twombly, Iqbal, the PSLRA, and the Y2K Act to-
gether prompts us to heed Professor Dodson’s call for a comparison 
not only of federal with foreign procedure but also of federal with 
state procedure.92  In the case of the PSLRA, it becomes clear that we 
cannot understand or predict the effects of procedural change in the 
federal courts without also considering the procedures available in 
state courts.  Plaintiffs frustrated by the PSLRA’s procedural hurdles—
such as its imposition of a stay of discovery pending the disposition of 
a motion for summary judgment—found their way into state courts.93  
Congress responded in 1998 by enacting the Securities Litigation Uni-
form Standards Act, which preempts “covered class actions” under state 
 
88 Dodson, supra note 76, at 469-70. 
89 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006). 
90 Id. §§ 6602, 6607. 
91 See generally Burbank, supra note 20, at 1731-32 (discussing the PSLRA as an ex-
ample of substance-specific procedural lawmaking by Congress). 
92 Dodson, supra note 76, at 471. 
93 See generally Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action:  Federal Ob-
stacles, State Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641, 677-80 (1997) (explaining that “[t]he stric-
tures of the [PSLRA] have led some plaintiffs’ attorneys to seek a detour around the 
obstacles in federal court by turning to state forums”). 
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law94 and authorizes federal courts hearing claims under the Securities 
Act of 1933 or the Securities Act of 1934 to stay state-court discovery 
under some circumstances.95  And when enacting the Y2K Act in 1999, 
Congress imposed its heightened pleading requirements not only on 
federal court actions but also on state court actions.96  Congress’s legis-
lative forays into state-court procedure raise constitutional questions,97 
but they also show an awareness that procedural reform in the federal 
courts requires consideration not only of federal court procedures but 
also of the procedures offered in competing state court fora. 
Third, experience under the PSLRA may help to illustrate the 
connections between private litigation and other forms of regulation.  
Professor Dodson makes this connection clear, noting that the optim-
al degree of court access for private litigants may sometimes depend 
in part on the extent to which government regulators stand ready to 
enforce the substantive law.98  This insight suggests that one interest-
ing avenue for research might explore the extent to which the 
PSLRA’s barriers to private securities litigation roughly coincided with 
a decrease in government regulation of the securities markets, and 
might also explore the extent to which both of these trends, in con-
junction, may have contributed to recent economic developments. 
So far I have only sketched the vistas that Professor Dodson’s ar-
ticle opens for research concerning procedure within the United 
States.  But of course his article is equally thought provoking with re-
spect to the pleading practices in other countries.  His survey of those 
countries’ pleading practices prompts us to ask what, in the U.S. expe-
rience, produces our anomalous practice of notice pleading, and what 
 
94 See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (“No covered class action based upon the statutory or 
common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or 
Federal court by any private party alleging . . . (A) a misrepresentation or omission of a 
material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or (B) that 
the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.”). 
95 See id. § 77z-1(b)(4) (1933 Act) (“Upon a proper showing, a court may stay dis-
covery proceedings in any private action in a State court as necessary in aid of its juris-
diction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments, in an action subject to a stay of dis-
covery pursuant to this subsection.”); id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(D) (1934 Act) (setting forth a 
similar provision). 
96 See id. § 6602(1)(A) (defining Y2K actions to include certain civil actions “com-
menced in any Federal or State court”); id. § 6607 (setting heightened pleading re-
quirements for Y2K actions). 
97 See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE 
L.J. 947, 953-55 (2001) (discussing, inter alia, constitutional issues raised by the Y2K Act). 
98 Dodson, supra note 76, at 468. 
STRUVE_REVISED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2010  6:36 PM 
438 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 421 
 
the result would be if we were to abandon it.  Here Professor Dodson 
aptly notes that procedural mechanisms operate as a system, and that 
it is difficult to analyze any one component of the system in isolation 
from the others.99 
Professor Dodson’s article thus calls on us to consider the ways in 
which a country allocates the enforcement of its substantive law.  For 
example, a country in which public enforcement of certain types of 
legal obligations is relatively strong may rely less on private enforce-
ment of such obligations and that balance may help to explain fea-
tures that restrict private litigants’ access to the courts to litigate such 
claims.  Here Professor Dodson’s observations about overseas devel-
opments in aggregate litigation are particularly intriguing because 
they suggest that in some foreign countries this balance may be shift-
ing, in the sense that some countries outside the United States are in 
fact experimenting with an expansion of their use of private suits to 
supplement governmental regulation.100 
Likewise, Professor Dodson prompts us to consider the ways in 
which pleading standards link to other mechanisms within the litiga-
tion system, such as discovery, summary judgment, and evidentiary 
standards.  Reading Professor Dodson’s article in conjunction with 
those by Professor Hartnett and Professor Schneider is illuminating in 
that respect, given that Professors Hartnett and Schneider underscore 
the connections among those devices.  In addition, Professors 
Schneider and Hartnett have focused us on the ways in which the 
choice and application of a pleading standard affects the division of 
tasks between judge and jury.  In systems that do not have (or have on-
ly recently acquired) a jury system, we might expect that a heightened 
pleading standard would have a different valence.  Professor Dodson’s 
comparative analysis also raises questions about the relevance of judi-
cial and lawyerly culture.  Do differences in the ways that judges are 
trained, selected, and retained affect the workings of a country’s 
pleading standard?  Might the nature of the local bar influence the 
way in which a pleading standard is applied in practice?101 
 
99 Id. at 463-64. 
100 Id. at 470 (“Other countries are experimenting with aggregate litigation, 
another quintessentially American phenomenon.”). 
101 Professor Jolowicz, for instance, notes that  
in England the main responsibility for pleadings and for the conduct of litiga-
tion rested, and still rests to a large extent, with the relatively small number of 
lawyers who practise as barristers, while the judges and the Masters, a small 
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Professor Dodson thus challenges procedure scholars to embark 
upon a research program that is as important as it is ambitious.  The 
comparison of U.S. and foreign procedure will enrich the domestic 
debate over matters such as pleading standards.  In some instances, 
such a comparison may prompt U.S. policymakers to adopt a mechan-
ism employed by other countries, such as a heightened pleading re-
quirement.  As Professor Dodson’s thoughtful discussion suggests, the 
transplanted mechanism may well function differently in its new envi-
ronment.  We might think of the transplant as the top layer of a 
Twombly painting, which receives some of its meaning from the 
erased or partially obscured layers beneath it. 
This brief Foreword has not done justice to any of the articles in 
this collection.  But I hope that it has indicated the importance of 
each author’s contribution as well as the synergies among their three 
projects.  Professor Hartnett provides litigators with key strategic in-
sights through his close reading of Twombly’s plausibility requirement 
and through his exploration of the uses of targeted discovery pending 
the disposition of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but 
he also concludes that the success of such strategies will rest largely 
within the discretion of the district judge.  Professor Schneider takes 
up the theme of judicial discretion and considers how that discretion 
manifests itself through the interconnections among Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions, summary judgment motions, and evidentiary rulings con-
cerning expert testimony.  Her exploration underscores the impor-
tance of examining how the exercise of that discretion may affect em-
ployment discrimination and other civil rights cases.  Professor 
Dodson’s comparative analysis of pleading standards urges scholars to 
deepen and broaden their analysis of U.S. procedure by measuring it 
against the practices in other countries.  Not only is his thoughtful in-
vestigation of this question an important step in advancing this project, 
but that investigation fits naturally with the other two articles in this col-
lection by inviting us to enrich our comparative analysis through a con-
sideration of the ways in which each discrete procedural element con-
nects to other parts of the relevant country’s procedural system. 
 
and homogeneous group of people, were, and to a large extent still are, for-
mer members of the Bar.  However strong the adversary idea may be, within 
such a context there are social and professional pressures whose tendency is to 
discourage excessive and unreasonable attempts to take advantage of an op-
ponent’s technical or formal mistakes.  
J.A. JOLOWICZ, ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 40-41 (2000). 
